Myths of the 'liberation' of Rīga 80 years ago

This article is part of the series “The Most Popular Myths in the 20th -21st Century History of Latvia” published on public media portal LSM.lv. The publication has been prepared within the framework of the State Research Program project “Navigating the Latvian History of the 20th-21st Century: Social Morphogenesis, Legacy and Challenges”

Exhibition about the Latvian towns that suffered damage in 1944

On 9 October, a travelling exhibition 1944 - The War-Caused Fractures in Latvian Urban Landscape, elaborated as part of a State Research Programme for the study of the 20th-21st century history of Latvia, returned to the Riflemen Square in Riga. The exhibition was opened on Freedom Square in Riga on 8 May, this year.

From Riga it travelled to the Latvian towns, which had suffered most from the Germany-USSR war in April-October 1944:  Rēzekne, Gulbene, Jelgava, Bauska, and Valmiera, as well as Salaspils Memorial.

At the end of the Second World War, Latvian towns suffered from air raids, land battles and destruction of strategic facilities by the German occupation authorities. Riga stands out from the overall picture by being somewhat “lucky ’, i.e., it suffered comparatively less damage. Although the Soviet-time myth of the “liberation” of Riga on 13 October 1944 has been comprehensively disproved,  the details about the decisions made by the two occupation rules and army commanders, which resulted in comparatively little damage to the cityscape of Riga, are still little known. 

Plans of the German and USSR armed forces in late September 1944

The main reason why Riga escaped with comparatively little damage was that the supreme command of the German army had not planned serious defence of the city. On 28 September 1944, after withdrawing from Estonia and Vidzeme region of Latvia,  units of German Army Group Nord reached Sigulda defence positions, located approximately  40 - 50 km from Riga.  Right after that the German 18th Army began planning further retreat towards Riga under the code name Donner (Thunder), which was to be launched on 16 October. The retreat was aimed at making available additional German forces in order to reinforce the positions of the German 3rd Tank Army dislocated in the northern part of Lithuania. One of the options was to launch offensive operation Blitz (Thunderstrike) to seize Jelgava and take control over railway line as far as Šiauliai in Lithuania.

On 30 September the Headquarters of the 3rd Baltic Front of the Red Army made a decision to suspend the unsuccessful offensive on the German positions in Sigulda. According to a new plan, the main direction of action would be the northern part of Lithuania, where the 1st Baltic Front would launch an offensive, while the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts would move towards Riga along the northern riverbank of the Daugava.

The three armies of the 3rd Baltic Front concentrated in the neighbourhood of Mālpils orientating their efforts in the direction Ropaži – Rīga, planning to use the 10th Tanks Corps. The 67th Army located on the northern riverbank of the Gauja was planning only local scale actions, launching an assault in the direction of Vecmīlgrāvis only in the final phase of the operation.

The 2nd Baltic Front planned an assault from the west of Madliena between railway line Rīga-Ērgļi and the River Ogre, using the 10th Guards Army and the 42nd Army.  To enhance success, the 5th Tanks Corps was brought to this area. The offensive was planned to start in the morning of 7 October 1944. If this plan succeeded, Riga would have turned into a battle-field, in which the Red Army intended to use more than 5000 cannons and mortars and over 500 tanks.

Modifications of German plan Donner

In the morning of 2 October 1944, news arrived at the headquarters of the German Army Group Nord located in Pelči near Kuldīga that the planned retreat was to begin six days earlier than scheduled, i.e., on 6 October as the Red Army’s preparations for an offensive on Lithuania were reported to proceed speedily.

During a meeting, several obstacles to the plan of the retreat were identified. First, according to Friedrich Jeckeln, SS Obergruppenführer and the supreme commander of Waffen-SS and police in Ostland, it was impossible to carry out all the planned evacuation measures in such a short time. Second, as noted in the war diary of the Army Group Nord, “decision must be made if Riga must be fully destroyed as suggested by Gauleiter for Ostland Erich Koch during his last meeting with the commander of the army group”.

Already in the evening of 2 October, the commander of the 16th Army received an order to start preparations for the destruction of the militarily and economically important facilities in Riga. However, it is obvious that “the destruction of Riga” was no longer possible. In the evening of the same day, Jeckeln was informed that it would be impossible to carry out all the planned measures, for example, instead of 6000 able bodied persons, it likely would be possible to evacuate only 1200.

On 5-7 October 1944, people were chased on the streets of Riga and transferred by force to Andrejosta Port, where ships were waiting to take them to Germany. Although as many as 5000 persons were thus detained, many of them were eventually set free and only 1200-1500 were actually taken to Germany

At 10:30 on 3 October 1944, the 18th Army received an order that retreat from their positions in Sigulda could start already in the evening of 5 October. The retreat began according to plan, however, during the subsequent 48 hours situation from the German perspective dramatically deteriorated: the 1st Soviet Baltic Front launched an offensive from Sauliai in the direction of Klaipeda, breaking through the weak defensive line of the German 3rd Tank Army.  

The collapse of the front disrupted any possibility of a German attack in the direction of Jelgava as well as practically put an end to the already perfunctorily planned measures for the destruction of Riga. According to the initial plans, the German forces would stop at the eastern suburbs of Riga and only after a brief pause would leave the city during operation Regen (Rain).

The assault of the Red Army in the direction of Riga

It was only in the morning of 6 October that the Red Army discovered that the Germans were retreating, and it completely disrupted their planned attack in the direction of Riga.  Although it did move westwards, the planned quick strikes of the two tank corps as far as the border of Riga failed to take  place. Until the morning of 10 October the 5th Tank Corps of the 2nd Baltic Front still tried to break into the eastern suburbs of Riga along the southern bank of the River Mazā Jugla, but was stopped to the south of Saurieši railway station.

On the morning of 9 October chief of the headquarters of the German Army Group Nord asked the headquarters of the German Land Forces to start operation Regen immediately after the completion of operation Donner. The decision to retreat from Riga without a fight was made in the morning of 11 October.

Military activities in the city of Riga were no longer part of the German plans and on 11 October at 16:30 German units receive the order formulated as “tomorrow it will rain”. Thus, the retreat of the German units that started in the evening of 5 October and continued without a pause until 16 October when they reached Kurzeme region.

During the night of 10 October, Marshall Leonid Govorov, coordinator of the activities of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts of the Red Army, issued an order, by which he admitted that it would not be possible to take Riga from the east side and a new plan was needed to crush the German Army Group Nord.

Considering the success of the 1st Baltic Front in the direction of Klaipeda in Lithuania, the Red Army’s goal now was to prevent the Germans from retreating from Riga freely. Towards this goal, the main forces of the 2nd Baltic Front, including the 5th and 10th Tank Corps and units of heavy artillery moved to the southern riverbank of the Daugava and launched hurried assaults on the suburbs of Riga located on that side of the Daugava (known as Pārdaugava) in the direction of Baldone. The 3rd Baltic Front had a different assignment: it had to follow the German forces in the direction of Riga, hampering their retreat.  

Forced crossing of Lake Ķīšezers

Over the next three days the German units retreated in a planned manner, while the Soviet 67th and 61st armies and the 1st Assault Army followed them, looking for an opportunity to break into Riga as soon as possible. By the afternoon of 12 October, the Soviet units reached the defensive line Lake Ķīšezers – Lake Jugla – Getliņi swamp. At this point the 3rd Baltic Front made a decision that later served as a base for the myth of ‘the liberation of Riga”. 

In the morning of 11 October, the 285th separate motorised special tasks battalion, which was dislocated in the vicinity of Cēsis, received an order to move to Pabaži. The battalion had been part of the 3rd Baltic Front as of early September 1944, but, according to reports, they could not find a way to put it to use. The battalion had as part of its armament 98 amphibian vehicles (79 of them combat capable)  manufactured by “Ford GPA” in USA that the USSR had obtained in the framework of Lendlease programme.  

The US-made “Ford GPA” amphibian vehicles at the disposal of the 285th separate motorised special ta...
The US-made “Ford GPA” amphibian vehicles at the disposal of the 285th separate motorised special tasks battalion of the Red Army in Latvia in autumn 1944.

In Pabaži,  the battalion was incorporated into the Soviet 112th Riflemen Corps and on 12 October at 07:00 received an order that for the first time mentioned the crossing of Lake Ķīšezers. At 10:00 the Soviet riflemen units started forced crossing of the River Gauja in order to take the positions that the Germans had abandoned in the southern bank of the river.

The 374th Riflemen Division was the first to accomplish the task, already at 10:30 capturing Jaunciems where in the afternoon it was joined by the 285th battalion. The forced crossing of Lake Ķīšezers started at 19:00 and an hour later the first units occupied Mežaparks meeting no resistance as the German units were already retreating on the western riverbank of the Daugava. By the morning of 13 October with American amphibian vessels and other means of waterway transportation 2800 persons had crossed the lake not only from the 374th Riflemen Division, but also from the 189th and 191st Riflemen Divisions, which for an unknown reason were omitted from the narrative of the legend of the “liberation of Riga”.

In the documents of the 285th Battalion it is the intelligence units of the 189th Riflemen Division that are mentioned as the first ones to cross the lake. During the forced crossing of the lake, nine amphibian vehicles were damaged by shell splinters that also wounded eight soldiers from the battalion. We know that during the forced crossing of Ķīšezers, several improvised craft sunk,  but the total losses on the Soviet side are not known.

The infrastructure of Riga Exports Port blown up by the German Armed Forces in October 1944.
The infrastructure of Riga Exports Port blown up by the German Armed Forces in October 1944.

Retreat from Riga

During the night of 13 October, the last German protection units left the eastern bank of the River Daugava, at 01:44 blowing up the bridges over the Daugava and the infrastructure of Riga Port. At 11:55 the 16th Army reported that the eastern riverbank of the Daugava had been fully evacuated. The last German units retreated, using the pontoon bridge built at Jumpravmuiža rather than Riga bridges.

The German units retreating on the western side of the Daugava, continued moving in the direction of Kurzeme region, leaving artillery units on the riverbank in Riga (in Pārdaugava suburbs) as a protection against a possible assault by the Red Army. Among the artillery units ready to open fire was also the 15th Latvian SS Volunteer Artillery Regiment, the total indirect fires capability which is evidenced by documents kept at the Latvian War Museum. If the Soviet forces seriously launched the forced crossing of the Daugava, nothing would have remained of the buildings in Riga on the eastern bank of the Daugava. 

The bridges of Riga blown up by the German Armed Forces on 13 October 1944 at 01:44.
The bridges of Riga blown up by the German Armed Forces on 13 October 1944 at 01:44.

Although in the framework of the myth created during the Soviet period, the forced crossing of Lake Ķīšezers became the most important element in the capture of Riga, wartime documents reveal a considerably different picture. Since the German units had left the western part of Riga,  absolutely all assaulting Soviet units reached the city centre at more or less the same time.

There are several mutually exclusive reports as to which riflemen division was the first to reach the blown-up Riga bridges.  For example, the Recce units of the 32nd guards of the Rifle Regiment of the 12th Guards Rifle Division , proceeding through Purvciems neighbourhood of Riga, are reported to have reached the Daugava riverbank on 13 October at 07:00, i.e., six hours after the bridges had been blown up and approximately at the same time with the vanguard of the 374th Riflemen Division. As a result of the Soviet artillery activities during nocturnal fights, Hotel Rome as well as the buildings of Riga Post Office and the Army Economic Store caught fire. Shell splinters and bullets left traces also on the Freedom Monument and the building of Riga Radiophone. It cut as harsh gaps in the face of Latvia’s capital as the loss of historical buildings destroyed in Old Riga already at the outset of Germany-USSR war in late June 1941.

It was already at 08:30 AM on 14 October when seven amphibian vehicles of the 285th battalion attempted to cross the Daugava from Kundziņsala Island and seize Voleri neighbourhood on the western riverbak of the Daugava, that the Soviet units realized what the forced crossing of Lake Ķīšezers would really have been like if the German troops decided to offer serious resistance.

The vehicles were allowed to approach at a distance of 100 metres from the riverbank and then all seven were hit by machine gun fire. Two of then sunk near the western bank of the Daugava while the remaining five managed to retreat and were abandoned at the eastern riverbank. The battalion lost 6 killed and 10 wounded soldiers as well as an accurately unidentified number of soldiers from the 374th Riflemen Division who were sitting in the vehicles as a landing party. During fights in the course of four days the battalion altogether lost 36 vehicles and in the morning of 15 October the units of the Red Army, which started arriving in Riga on the left side of the Daugava (Pārdaugava), were only partially combat-capable.

A soldier of the German Armed Forces on the left bank of the Daugava in Riga (in Pārdaugava) in mid-...
A soldier of the German Armed Forces on the left bank of the Daugava in Riga (in Pārdaugava) in mid-October 1944.

Rīga cityscape escaping destruction

It was due to the coincidence of several factors that the cityscape of Riga suffered relatively little damage in October 1944. The Red Army targeted its offensive primarily at the northern part of Lithuania in the direction of Klaipēda where it achieved its greatest success, thus Riga was no longer in the focus of attention of either the German Army Group Nord, or the commanders of the Soviet 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts.

When the German units started retreating in the evening of 5 October, they no longer attempted to offer any resistance on the eastern riverbank of the Daugava. Since the retreat was launched ten days earlier than originally planned, the German civilian occupation authorities and security institutions did not have enough time fully to carry out the planned destruction. The massive assault that the Soviet troops had planned to launch on the eastern part of Riga to the south of Lake Jugla failed, thus the artillery and tank units, which, for example had caused the greatest ravage in Jelgava and Valmiera cities in the summer and autumn of 1944, were transferred to the western riverbank of the Daugava and did not have time to wreak destruction in the city of Riga.

It was only after the Second World War that the forced crossing of Lake Ķīšezers was artificially presented as the main factor in the speedy taking of Riga, singling out only a few units to create a coherent story, teeming with ruse of war and heroism.

 

      

 

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